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Abstract
The stability in financial markets is important to promote economic growth. Due
to its fundamental importance, the causes of market instability are of broad in-
terest. The purpose of this dissertation is to propose plausible explanations of
financial market phenomena related to market stability such as prices, liquidity,
volatility, information value, welfare, and market efficiency. The premise in the
analysis is that uncertainty in financial markets is multidimensional and informa-
tion structure is complex. To be more precise, in modern financial markets, form-
ing consistent beliefs about the fundamental values of securities, the composition of
market participants, and other market characteristics are complex and uncertain.
On the basis of this premise, this dissertation investigates the trading decisions,
order sizes, liquidity, security prices, information value, welfare, and market ef-
ficiency to shed light on the causes of financial market instability (fragility) and
makes a number of empirical predictions some of which provide explanations for
results that have been reported in the empirical market microstructure literature
and others are yet to be tested. The dissertation also identifies conditions under
which markets are vulnerable to instability and thus also has important policy
implications.
The first phenomenon investigated in this dissertation is sudden liquidity deteri-
orations and improvements in financial markets. Chapter 2 presents a security
price formation model with ambiguous liquidity provision. The model provides a
unified and parsimonious framework to explain the empirically documented fea-
tures that market liquidity can suddenly deteriorate during market crashes and
improve during trading reforms. Consequently, ambiguity in liquidity provision
can increase the value of information and social welfare. The ambiguous price
formation model helps to understand (i) the dynamics of ambiguity, (ii) the deter-
minants of time-varying ambiguity aversion of liquidity providers, (iii) the price
and liquidity dynamics during various order flow patterns, and (iv) the effect of
trade size on security prices during ambiguous market episodes.
Chapter 3 develops a model in which traders face uncertainty about the composi-
tion of informed and uninformed traders (composition uncertainty) to investigate
the “crowded-trade” problem (not being able to know how many others are taking
vii
the same position) in financial markets. This chapter characterizes the equilibrium
in the information market where both types of traders are affected by composi-
tion uncertainty and in the financial market where only uninformed traders are
affected, leading the uninformed traders to be disadvantaged in the face of com-
position uncertainty. This composition uncertainty distorts traders’ information
acquisition, demands, and perceived equity premium, resulting in undervalued
(resp. overvalued) stock when traders are sufficiently (resp. insufficiently) uncer-
tainty averse. The model helps to understand a linkage between liquidity and asset
prices, proposes plausible explanations for large price swings, and demonstrates
how regulations to enhance market efficiency may not work when the composition
of traders is uncertain.
Chapter 4 shows that when market participants learn about the level of adverse
selection from order flow, a large order imbalance can be destabilizing, causing
sharp price movements and evaporation of liquidity, as it signals high “toxicity”
(adverse selection). While such effect is consistent with the practitioner view that
order flow is informative about toxicity, it contrasts with standard microstructure
models in which the level of adverse selection is assumed to be known and thus
order imbalance improves liquidity by revealing private information. The model
helps to understand when markets are most susceptible to imbalance-induced in-
stability and the dynamic process of how markets digest order imbalance.
Chapter 5 examines the implications of the true complexity of real-world informa-
tion on market efficiency. Using the literature of decision theories and information
sciences, Chapter 5 discusses how accounting different attributes of information
can unify two controversial views, efficient markets hypothesis and behavioral fi-
nance. The main thesis advanced is that the roots of behavioral anomalies are
the imprecision and reliability of information. By exemplifying different decision
scenarios, Chapter 5 argues that the decision making is rational with precise and
reliable information, whereas becomes more behavioral in nature as the informa-
tion becomes more imprecise and unreliable.
Overall, the results of this dissertation suggest that multiple dimensions of uncer-
tainty formalized in different languages can illuminate on various aspects of market
stability that we otherwise label as anomalies and offer a promising middle ground
between efficient markets hypothesis and behavioral finance.
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